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the power to change the use in such instances.1 9 In performance of governmental functions, the municipality acts in its capacity as an agency of
the state and not in its proprietary function. 20 Thus, the great majority
of courts hold that the control of public parks belongs primarily to the
21
state and not to the cities in which they are located.
Florida in the instant case has, by dictum stating that the use of the
park could be changed with legislative authority, accepted the liberal
view in regard to private land dedicated for a specific public use, the
fee of which is in the municipality. Because of the factual situation, the
actual holding equitably carries out the intention of the original grantor;
but the rule accepted by dictum is susceptible of an unjust result, since
the legislature can by appropriate action completely void the intent of the
grantor by changing the use of, or even disposing of, the property which
was dedicated in good faith to posterity. Under such a rule, continued use
of the property for the dedicated purposes can be guaranteed in only one
way, that is, by retention of the fee by the grantor and his successors, a
mere easement for park purposes going to the public.

Wn Li.m GUNDLACH, JR.

DISCOVERY: ARE WORK PRODUCTS OF ADVERSE
PARTY SUBJECT TO DISCOVERY?
Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Allen, 40 So2d 115 (Fla. 1949)
In a personal injury action against the defendant railroad, by virtue
of Section 91.30, Florida Statutes 1941, plaintiff proceeded to take the
deposition of the general superintendent of the railroad. A subpoena
Mass. 432, 131 N. E. 291 (1921); Higginson v. Slattery, 212 Mass. 583, 99 N. E. 523
(1912); Mowry v. Providence, 16 R. I. 422, 16 AtI. 511 (1889); Clarke v. Providence,
16 R. I. 337, 15 AtI. 763 (1888); Rayor v. Cheyenne, 178 P.2d 115 (Wyo. 1947).
9
' Reichelderfer v. Quinn, 287 U. S. 315 (1932).

"0Commissioner v. Sherman, 69 F.2d 755 (C. C. A. 1st 1934); Town of Winchester
v. Cox, 129 Conn. 106, 26 A.2d 592 (1942); Kaufman v. Tallahassee, 84 Fla. 634, 94
So. 697 (1922) ; Hoggard v. City of Richmond, 172 Va. 145, 200 S. E. 610 (1939).
2

Winchester v. Cox, 129 Conn. 106, 26 A.2d 592 (1942); Epstein v. New Haven,

104 Conn. 283, 132 AtI. 467 (1926); City of Hartford v. Maslem, 76 Conn. 599, 57

Ad. 740 (1904); Rayor v. Cheyenne, 178 P.2d 115 (Wyo. 1947).
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duces tecum was issued requiring that he produce all written statements
made by the employees of the defendant and any other persons relating
to the occasion. Upon denial of the defendant's motion to quash the subpoena duces tecum, the defendant obtained a writ of certiorari in the
Supreme Court. Basing the decision on its interpretation of Hickman v.
Taylor,' the Court stated that the work products of the adverse party,
his agent, or his attorney, are not to be differentiated, and all exceed the
subject-matter of discovery. HELD, the materials sought by plaintiff were
not subject to discovery. Motion to quash granted.
In respect to discovery of statements obtained in anticipation of litigation, the decisions that followed the adoption of the present Federal Rules 2
in 1938 were in hopeless conflict, both as to their meaning and their application. 3 The slight majority of the earlier cases were rather conservative
and denied discovery of such materials on the broad ground that the Rules
were not to be made the vehicle by which one litigant could make use of
his opponent's preparation of the case. 4 Other reasons given by the courts
in denying discovery were these: Witnesses were equally available to
both parties;5 there was no showing of good cause; 6 proof was lacking that
the documents existed or, if they did, that they contained evidence material
to the issues of the case; 7 and the information had been obtained by the
defendant's insurer. 8 Many courts, however, even from the beginning
interpreted the rules liberally, allowing free discovery of all facts and
statements within the knowledge of the parties or of other witnesses. 9
Early in 1947 the landmark case of Hickman v. Taylor was handed

down by the United States Supreme Court, in which discovery was refused
on the specific ground that it was "an attempt, without purported necessity or justification, to secure written statements, private memoranda and
personal recollections prepared or formed by an adverse party's counsel
1329 U. S. 495 (1947).
'Fir. Ruis Civ. Paoc., 28 U. S. C. A. following §723(c) (1941 and Supp. 1948).
'See Note, 166 A. L. R. 1442, 1446 (1947).
'See McCarthy v. Palmer, 29 F. Supp. 585, 586 (E. D. N. Y. 1939).
'French 'v. Zalstem-Zalessky, 1 F. R. D. 508 (S. D. N. Y. 1940).
'Gordon v. Pennsylvania R. R., 5 F. R. D. 510 (E. D. Pa. 1946).
T
Condry v. Buckeye S. S. Co., 4 F. . D. 310 (W. D. Pa. 1945).
'Stark v. American Dredging Co., 3 F. R. D. 300 (E. D. Pa. 1943).
'E.g., Price v. Levitt, 29 F. Supp. 164 (E. D. N. Y. 1939); Stark v. American
Dredging Co., 3 F. 1. D. 300 (E. D. Pa. 1943); Eiseman v. Pennsylvania R. R.,
3 F. R. D. 338 (E. D. Pa. 1944); Barreca v. Pennsylvania R. R., 5 F. R. D. 391
'(E. D. N. Y. 1946).
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in the course of his legal duties."'1 Thus the "work product" of the attorney was protected; but the Court indicated that this privilege was not
to be extended to the workings of the adverse party or his agent, as was
done in the instant case.
Since that case in 1947, the decisions have been almost unanimous in
supporting the liberal view, especially in personal injury actions against
railroads. Citing the Hickman case as their basic authority, the cases have
made a clear distinction between what an attorney does to prepare his
client's cause for trial and what a claim agent does for his employer prior
to institution of a lawsuit. The latter is a proper subject for discovery. 1
Nevertheless, the Florida Supreme Court, in the principal case, has refused
to make any such distinction.
The principal case cites the 1944 Cumulative Supplement to Moore's
Federal Practice for its holding; 12 but the 1948 Supplement notes the
change to the liberal view, admonishing the courts against allowing their
discretion to become "crystallized into an inflexible prohibition against
any discovery of this sort."' 8. This discretion to deny discovery is afforded
the courts by the Rules to protect the deponent from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or unreasonableness.' 4 When, however, a protective order is sought, the movant must substantiate the need for protection
or it will be denied, 15 the test being the practical burden on the deponent
when weighed against the benefit to the discoverer.' 0 No showing of need
was made by the defendant in the instant case, yet the Court quashed the
subpoena.
The Court's far too conservative reasoning is contrary to the modem
trend in the application of the deposition-discovery rules. It lays down a
proposition that will completely undermine discovery in Florida and, in
effect, supplant legislative intent by judicial discretion.
DAVID
10329

R. LEwIS

U. S. 495, 510 (1947).

'1 E.g., Hughes v. Pennsylvania R. R., 7 F. R. D. 737 (E. D. N. Y. 1948); Thomas
v. Pennsylvania R. R., 7 F. R. D. 610 (E. D. N. Y. 1947); Hanke v. Milwaukee Electric Ry. & Transport Co., 7 F. R. D. 540 (E. D. Wis. 1947); Cogdlll v. TVA, 7
F. R. D. 411 (E. D. Tenn. 1947).
"2 P. 264.
1"2

MooRE, FmnzAL PRAcricE §26.12 (Cum. Supp. 1948).

1

"Mehrtens, Deposition and Discovery in Florida Under the Federal Rules, I U. or
FLa. L. Riv. 149, 172 (1948).
15
Id. at 173.
0
"id. at 172.
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